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MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY. By
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Paper. $24.95. ISBN: 0-198-26024-5.
In this provocative book, Robert P. George defends morals laws
(laws that prescribe moral virtues and punish those who commit moral
offenses), which are seen by most contemporary liberal theorists as
violative of the rights of persons with unpopular morals. George
defends these laws from the perspectives of Aristotelian and Thomistic
political theories, insofar as these theories view law and politics as
rightly concerned with the perfection of the virtue of political
communities. He explores the relationship between these political
theories and jurisprudence in an early chapter on the debate between the
philosopher H.L.A. Hart and the jurist Patrick Devlin. Devlin would
accept some morals laws in order to promote political stability, but he
does not believe that a jurist ought to consider the validity of the moral
claims that the laws seek to enforce. This chapter shows that for a moral
realist like George, the immorality of the proscribed act is a necessary,
but not sufficient, requirement for the validity of such laws.
In the central chapters of the book, George develops his argument
for morals laws by engaging the prominent liberal theorists who are
critical of them. In Chapter 3, he argues that Ronald Dworkin fails to
derive a right to moral independence from a principle of equal concern
and respect. For Dworkin, a right to moral independence proscribes
laws that would interfere with an individual's ability to determine
morality for him or herself. But, George shows that Dworkin conceives
of the common good as collective utilitarian interests, and he argues that
this way of viewing the common good is utterly hopeless.
Chapter 4 considers Jerry Waldron's argument that sometimes
people have a moral right to do what is morally wrong. George
concedes that some immorality inheres in all societies, but this
concession limits the scope of morals laws. It does not mean that the
law must be entirely separated from prescribing morals and punishing
moral wrongdoing. And, in Chapter 5, which takes up the thought of
John Rawls through the writing of David A.J. Richard, a prominent
Rawlsian, George criticizes the subjectivity of morality in Richard and
Rawls's work.
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These forms of contemporary liberal theory fail for George in part
because they reject the belief that progress toward a morally perfect
society can be judged by objective criteria. The perfectionist alternative
that George develops allows a space for a government to use coercive
force to promote moral progress measured against an abstract
foundational moral principle that has its origins in the work of Germain
Grisez and John Finnis. (16) Their new natural law theory claims to be
a comprehensive resourcement of Aquinas's theory and to escape the
objections that have undermined Thomism at least since the
Enlightenment. While George views perfectionist moral theory to be
suitable for a pluralistic society, it is here that criticism can be made.
George's account of perfectionist pluralism seems to depend on the strict
avoidance of metaphysical conceptions of human nature. But, without
metaphysics, the new natural law seems to be merely another
restatement of the Kantian categorical imperative. This view of the
Grisez-Finnis project was advanced by Russell Hittinger. 1  Still,
George's thought-provoking insights are refreshing and welcome in a
field dominated by moral skepticism.
Kevin P. Leet
1. A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (U. of Notre Dame Press 1987).
t University of Chicago, The Divinity School, Chicago, Illinois.
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